HOW I TAUGHT LAW AND ECONOMICS by Samuels, Warren J.
Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005  1
HOW I TAUGHT LAW AND ECONOMICS 
 
 
Warren J. Samuels 
Professor Emeritus 







I taught graduate law and economics for some years at Michigan State 
University. Technically it was listed either under Public Finance, in which 
field I had taught graduate and undergraduate Public Expenditure Theory for 
some years, or as a free-standing course (not within a field). The actual title 
of the course, Economics 819, was Economic Role of Government. The 
catalog description of the course read: Analysis of fundamentals of 
economic role of government with focus on social control and social 
change; legal basis of economic institutions; applications to specialized 
problems and institutions. The specific objectives of the course were three: 
1.   Insight into the “fundamentals of the economic role of government” 
beyond spending and taxing per se. 
2.    Insight into the problems of studying the fundamentals of the 
economic role of government: sources and conceptual, ideological and 
substantive materials. 
3.    Identification and mastery of several alternative approaches to the 
economic role of government, or to “law and economics.” 
I taught the course once a year for over ten years, sometimes during the 
regular academic year and sometimes during the summer. After technically 
retiring I taught the course each Fall for several years. 
 
1. INTRODUCTORY  LECTURES 
The specific approaches comprising the course are (1) Neoclassical, which 
has two strands, Pigovian and Paretian; (2) Institutional; (3) Critical Legal 
Studies; and (4) Marxian; these were briefly elaborated upon.  The 
principal focus, however, was said to be on the juxtaposition of the 
Neoclassical and Institutionalist approaches through readings and lectures.  
The Neoclassical approach is presented in detail in Werner Z. Hirsch’s 
textbook, Law and Economics:  An Introductory Analysis.  2nd ed., 1988, 
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and is richly summarized in Nicholas Mercuro and Steven G. Medema, 
Economics and the Law: From Posner to Post-Modernism, 1997.  The 
neoclassical approach will be presented and critiqued in the lectures.  The 
lectures, coupled with the other texts, will examine in depth the 
Institutional approach.   
At this point I felt it incumbent to caution the students, for this course 
will be unlike any they have ever had and certainly like no other in our 
program.  I also say that I will be making a wide range of introductory 
points in order to indicate something of the range and the content of what 
we will be covering in the course.  These points will sometimes be 
reiterated, in order to suggest that they relate to other points in an 
extremely complex analysis, and to suggest something of how they relate. 
Before I summarize the cautions, I should now take notice of two 
reviews of my Economics, Governance and Law (Northampton, MA: 
Edward Elgar, 2002) by reviewers who certainly understood what my 
approach was all about
1.  Richard Sturn employs a distinction made by 
Abba Lerner in an article which I had read when it was published and had 
since forgotten.  Lerner argued that “an economic transaction is a solved 
political problem”, the latter involving “essentially the transformation of 
the conflict from a political problem to an economic transaction” (Abba 
Lerner, “The Economics and Politics of Consumer Sovereignty,” American 
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, vol. 62, no. 2 (May 1972), 258-
266, p. 259).  Sturn perceptively holds that my position argues “that what 
Lerner calls ‘political problems’ are never ever ‘solved’ once and for all” 
(Ricard Sturn, Book Review, The European Journal of the History of 
Economic Thought, vol. 11, no. 2 (Summer 2004), pp. 328-30, p. 328). 
Sturn further argues that I “challenge the foundational choice of problems” 
by both “mainstream economic analysis” and “all currents of politico-
economic thought which combine two commitments: (i) a commitment to 
some form of individualism; [and] (ii) a commitment to the view that it 
belongs to the professional task of economists to provide the theoretical 
basis for the translation of as many conflicts as possible from contested 
political problems into economic transactions whose desirability can be 
determined solely in terms of efficiency.” Sturn perceptively carries my 
argument further: 
To conceptualize political conflict primarily as something  we 
ideally should and perhaps could get rid of, ‘obfuscates’ … the 
fact that  under modern conditions government, governance and 
policy are inevitably important, ubiquitous and activist.  In 
modern  reality, there is no  uncontested realm of law, property 
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and voluntary exchange and market whose anchors and 
boundaries are settled by rules once and for all:  the battle-cries 
in favor of de-politicization and deregulation are as political as 
regulation itself.  ‘Politicisation is inevitable’ … Theories 
suggesting the minimization of political regulation and 
governance are based on an untenable ontology and typically 
function as ideologies serving the interests of particular groups.  
All important rules and norms are essentially and permanently 
contested.  Reasoning which promotes the minimization of the 
scope of politics as a social ideal rests on demonstrably false 
premises.  But it may alter the direction of political decision 
making and its distributional impact.  These ideologies are built 
on  ontological illusions yet may have real effects within the 
political and legal process itself …” (p. 329) 
 
In the second review of my book, Peter Boettke summarizes my view 
of “the complex reality of the interaction of polity, economy and society” 
thus: 
1)   Government is an instrument of social control and can be, 
and will be, used by whoever can get in the position to use it 
for their benefit; 
2)    What we perceive as the economy emerges out of the 
complex institutions and processes that are worked out in 
the legal economic nexus; 
3)   The policy debate is never about government intervention or 
not government intervention, government intervention is 
omnipresent and thus the question is always about the 
change of the interests whom government is used to support.  
(Peter Boettke, Book Review, History of Economic Ideas, 
vol. XI, no. 3, 2003, pp.156-58, p., 157.) 
Sturn and Boettke get my position right; too bad the reviews (and my 
book, of course) had not been available to help with my cautions. What I 
identified as my “preliminary cautions” ran along the following lines (a 
composite of two sets of introductory notes) much of which involves how 
the Institutional approach differs from the Neoclassical approach. 
The course will aggravate some students because it explores the 
fundamental importance of government for the economy and because it 
attempts to reach no conclusions as to the proper role of government or as 
to the correct specific policies of government.  For example, in affirming 
that government will necessarily promote certain interests rather than 
others, it is intended to say nothing as to whose interest will count and be 
promoted by government-except to affirm that government will promote Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005 
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certain interests rather than others even when it superficially appears that it 
is not.  
I then said that two distinctions had to be made: one between 
explanation and justification, and the other between language which 
describes and language which attempts to motivate psychologically for the 
purposes of power. I said further that I will appear cynical in discounting 
various claims, that I admit to a great deal of cynicism; and that no 
implication for or against a policy should be drawn when rendering such 
distinctions and claims. 
Two important dichotomies were emphasized. One juxtaposes liberal 
democratic society in the abstract to the specifics of freedom and control, 
and continuity and change, in actual institutionalized systems. The second 
distinguishes pure abstract a-institutional conceptual markets from actual 
markets that are a function of the institutions which form and operate 
through them.  Actual markets, furthermore, are a function of the structure 
and policies of firms and of the legal and moral framework.  I then posed 
the problem of equating the pure conceptual market with the actual 
institutionalized market: this is equivalent to privileging the actual market, 
and therefore the structure on which it is based.  Correlative thereto are the 
further problems, (1) identifying optimality solely on voluntary exchange 
within the existing market, when the pure theory may or may not apply to it 
and may apply to others; and (2) using existing prices and costs, thereby 
giving effect to the existing market and the structure on which it is based.   
The foregoing brought me to several key propositions. (1) 
Neoclassical economics explains resource allocation as a  function of the 
market, which is a function in turn of demand and supply, whereas 
Institutional economics lengthens the explanatory chain by  adding, “… 
which is a function of power structure, which is a function of relative legal  
rights, which is a function of government, which is a function of who 
controls and uses government to promote their interests; (2) Most questions 
of legal-economic policy are matters of legal change of the legal 
framework; (3) Law and government are objects of use to control and 
change actual markets; (4) Markets are not neutral; how they operate 
depends in part on who controls their legal  foundations; (5) Neither market 
nor rights are independently constituted; they are, rather, instituted and 
changed through social construction; (6) Government is not external to the 
economic system: government is what it is because of the economic 
system, and the economic system is what it is because of government; both 
are a function of the legal-economic nexus; (7) Propositions about the 
economic role of government likely reflect and give effect to an attitude or 
sentiments and not legal-economic reality, but nonetheless can influence 
the social construction of reality; (8) The overriding principle is that of the 
use of government:  government is an instrument, or tool, available for the Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005  5
use of whoever can control it; (9) Government can be an instrument of the 
powerful, or a check on  the power of the powerful, or both; (10) The 
economy is a process in which (a) utility maximization within a given legal 
structure and (b) efforts to change the legal structure are jointly and 
interactively worked out.  
Several false or misleading dichotomies were pointed out: (1) 
Nonintervention or laissez-faire versus reform: Legal change of law is the 
central problem; law is not intruding into a situation in which it hitherto has 
been absent but, in changing or reforming the law, etc., government is 
changing the interest to which it is giving its support. The problem is not 
government versus no government, but which interests government is used 
to protect and which to inhibit. (2) Regulation versus deregulation: 
Regulation protects Alpha from Beta; deregulation protects Beta from 
Alpha. The status quo point denotes one rather than another structure of 
rights (interests protected by law), one rather than another derivative price 
and cost structure, one or another set of externalities, and one or another 
allocation of resources.  When the issue is whose interest is to count, some 
notion of public purpose or social welfare, etc., is needed. (3) Polity versus 
economy: The two are not only mutually interdependent, they both emanate 
from a common legal-economic nexus. 
Jockeying for positions of power from which to control government 
typically involves obfuscation: obfuscation that the jockeying for position 
is going on, that the legal-economic nexus exists and is continuing to 
generate legal change, that rights and the status quo are selectively being 
treated as natural or absolute, of the fundamental role of government as a 
mode of social control through, in part, social purpose. 
The students are asked to consider in their own minds the usual 
propositions centering on self-interest and its maximization or 
optimization. These propositions can have several meanings: (1) A 
definition of reality, as to how people actually behave.  But this tends to be 
tautological: whatever is pursued as self-interest is self-interest because it is 
pursued.  (2) A methodological limiting assumption. (3) A normative 
“ought.” Furthermore, is self-interest the driving force or is it a check on 
the driving force—or both? Consider also the proposition that we should do 
away with any barriers to trade. I tell of my undergraduate students who 
think that there should be a market for everything and that government 
should not intervene. I point out, first, that markets require laws; the free 
market is not devoid of law. Second, when I respond by proposing that 
grades will be sold to the highest bidders, quiet reigned supreme in class. 
(4) A “free market” can exist, but with what institutions, with what 
structure of power? 
I indicate that the foregoing both stands on its own and constitutes a 
critique of Neoclassical law and economics.  Moreover, I emphasize (1) the Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005 
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fact of the social construction of legal-economic reality, rather than 
positing an independent, given, and self-subsistent system; (2) the legal-
economic nexus from which emanates what we conventionally, and 
selectively, designate the economic and the political, or the private and the 
public, spheres; (3) the psychic balm (emotional comfort, setting minds at 
rest) and social control (including legitimization) functions performed by 
presuming a given, eternal system, which also abets those with interests in 
status-quo legal-economic arrangements; (4) that law and policy are not as 
different as one might imagine, i.e., law is policy and policy is a mode of 
making law; and (5) that policy is a result of partisan mutual adjustment 
(bargaining, in various forms and within various structures, the structures 
themselves both a matter and an object of policy). 
I suggest that hysteria about government is vain and an empty form of 
amusement, anxiety and/or manipulation.  The real problems are those as to 
choice of the organization and control of the economy, i.e., of access to, 
use of, and the effects of, power.  As for our being economists and not legal 
scholars, I stress that law is not a private mystery into which none but the 
lawyer can enter. 
I endeavor to make clear to the students that I intend for them to 
master and acquire an ability to work with or within each of the approaches 
and to apply each approach to some common problem.  This mastery 
requires them to conduct a continuing exercise in the analysis of texts and 
involves identifying the selective perception and choices involved in both 
making policy under them and in making sense of them.  Again I caution 
the students that this approach will raise questions about their belief 
system.  Normally it is in respect to these questions that the belief system 
functions as a protective belt.  But here we tend strongly to challenge 
student belief systems in order to get to the fundamentals of what is going 
on in the working out of the economic role of government.  I reiterate that, 
counting lectures and all the readings, the course is intended to cover 
multiple perspectives.  My own personal perspective is not affirmed to be 
“correct” but it will inevitably govern what I have to say. 
I suggest the matrix approach to meaning.  You have a question, and 
you have five or six different views on that question-say, five different 
approaches. And within each approach, you have several different 
subsidiary views; branches, as it were.  So you have A, B, C, D, and E and 
within each of them you have, say, C1, 2, and 3. So what is the object X?  
Is the object X to be understood by A or by B or by C, or A1 or A3 or D3?  
It seems to me, even if I were to believe that E3 is the correct one, that if I 
look at the world, what’s really going on out there, without putting myself 
and E3 at the top of a pyramid, is a matrix of positions, and that there likely 
must be something to be learned from the matrix formed by all these 
positions.  Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005  7
Typically I again discussed the several approaches.  In the Marxian 
approach, for example, I identify the functions of government to be (1) an 
instrument of class domination, (2) a facilitator of capital accumulation, 
and (3) a rationalizer and protector of the system.  Apropos of 
neoclassicism I reiterate some of the assumptions required in order to reach 
unique determinate optimal equilibrium solutions to problems of resource 
allocation.  I indicate some problems of Neoclassical and Marxian 
economics, for example, whether or not the economy is independent and 
self-subsistent; whether the economy is more than the market, i.e., whether 
markets are to be understood in pure, a-institutional conceptual terms or in 
terms of the institutions/power structure which form and operate through 
them; and the need for some assumption as to the relationship of a theory to 
the status quo system and structure. 
The Institutional approach is said to put emphasis on the factors and 
forces at work in the economic, or legal-economic, process with regard to 
(1) the organization and control (power structure) of the economic system 
and its evolution; and (2) resource allocation (etc.) with a wider scope of 
variables and longer chain of reasoning, and not on unique determinate 
optimal equilibrium solutions.  As for the latter, I urge that there is no such 
solution, only optimal etc. solutions specific to the structure of rights-rights 
determined by and through government (including the legal system), i.e., 
through the uses to which government/legal system is put. 
I note that all approaches (1) share an instrumental view of the state, 
(2) have different values and definitions of reality, for example, accepting 
or rejecting the logic and ontological status of the market, or capitalist, 
economy; and (3) that the affirmative theory of each constitutions an 
approach to the use of government. 
The lectures continue with a wide ranging survey of relevant 
methodological concerns. 
I distinguish methodological and normative individualism and 
collectivism.  As to normative individualism and normative collectivism, I 
indicate that the following questions necessarily arise: (1) which 
individuals (2) within what structure and (3) that performance is, inter alia, 
a function of structure.  I identify the problem of structure versus results in 
part thusly: That on any topic we tend to (1) make assumptions as to 
structure, or seek agreement on structure, further assuming that whatever 
results thereof arise will be deemed acceptable; or (2) identify desired 
results and thereby assume and legitimize whatever structure will yield the 
desired results. 
As to methodological individualism and methodological collectivism, 
I point out (1) that use of the market (“the market works”) involves a social 
welfare function, either explicit or implicit; (2) that the market produces an 
efficient allocation of resources as a function of efficiency being defined in Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005 
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terms of free market adjustment; (3) that the content of the legal framework 
is often the point at issue; (4) that individuals may pursue the maximization 
of their self-interest, but that preferences and interests are learned (treated 
as given by the analyst but not given in actual economies); (5) that the use 
of the Pareto-criterion has the effect, if not the intent, of protecting either 
the existing or some assumed power structure; and (6) that one problem is 
that of the definition of output, and that in many cases what defines a 
product-output is stipulated in law. 
The positive and normative distinction is reviewed (1) in terms of 
what is vis-à-vis what ought to be; and (2) that one cannot derive an ought 
from an is alone, that additional normative premises are required.  A 
distinction is drawn between positivism as being concerned with what is 
and a conditional positivism as being with what is necessary to achieve a 
particular normative goal. 
The role of economic theory as a rationalization of the market system 
is underscored using a quotation from Kenneth Arrow and Tibor Scitovsky, 
AEA Readings in Welfare Economics, 1969, p. 2: “Modern economics 
developed more or less as the rationalization of the laissez-faire economy, 
hence its preoccupation with the private sector and the operations of the 
market in the private sector.” 
Instead of treating law as unimportant, as a given, as dysfunctional, 
and/or as exogenous to the economic system, the emphasis in this course is 
on the importance and ubiquity of law.  All aspects of life must be seen to 
have a pertinent body of law.  New developments, such as new technology, 
introduce new relationships between people, and law is called upon to 
identify and protect as rights the respective interests of the parties.  An 
example is the technology that enables surrogate motherhood or parenthood 
(disposition of frozen embryos).  This introduces novel situations and 
conflicting claims of interest, the need to establish who has what rights and 
duties, and to whom.  Competing analogies with existing laws are drawn, 
driven in part by premises as to whose interest should count, and how. 
Specifically with regard to the lectures, several characteristics are 
identified:   
(1)  The point of view is said to be radical in the sense of dealing 
with fundamentals.  Government will be shown, whether we 
like it or not, to be deeply involved in the definition and 
creation of the economy.  Also to be shown are the efforts 
that are continually being made to obfuscate the role of 
government in defining and creating the economy so as to 
selectively channel both the definition and the (re)creation 
of the economy, efforts that are willy nilly a part of the 
processes of definition and (re)creation itself.  Among these 
efforts are the pretense that rights are absolute and an Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005  9
emphasis on the quantity theory, the gold standard, inflation 
as an issue, all in order to “limit” the economic role of 
government.  Whereas rights are not absolute; they are 
relative to each other and to the processes of government 
through which they are chosen and remade; and the gold 
standard etc. each involves government.  The proximate 
critical matter is almost always the legal change of law, that 
is, the change by law of the interests to which government is 
to give its support.  Government is inexorably involved in 
the status quo, and the question is that of the change of the 
details of that involvement.  Although the economy and 
polity are typically comprehended as essentially self-
subsistent and independent, albeit interactive spheres or 
processes, there is a “legal-economic nexus” in which both 
originate in an ongoing manner. 
(2)  As already indicated, the point of view encompasses twin 
interactive processes:  the working out of optimal solutions 
through inter-agent trade, and the restructuring of rights. 
(3)   The materials of the course are exceedingly complex, 
requiring some redundancy. 
(4)   The course, at least the lectures, will dissatisfy some 
students, because no attempt will be made to reach solutions 
to problems of policy.  The focus of attention is on 
examining what is going on in the world of policy.  No 
assumption is made that a unique determinate optimal 
solution must be reached for any problem of policy; nor is it 
assumed that the instructor’s position on policy should be 
given a privileged solution.  The further focus is, instead, on 
the process of working out solutions to policy problems. 
(5)   In the history of economic thought one finds varying   
combinations of (a) economic theory and (b) valuational   
paradigms that produce varying explanations  of how the 
economy works and what policy (law) should be.  This is 
neatly illustrated by Malthus and Ricardo both using their 
theory of rent plus each author’s  own valuational paradigm 
in order to produce systems of economic thought affirming 
the status, for Malthus, of landed property and landed 
gentry, and, for Ricardo, of nonlanded property and business 
class in relation to the Corn Laws.   
 
I next commence examining legal-economic complexity, pointing out 
that one can treat legal and economic systems as conceptually and/or 
substantively separate but in actuality the legal and economic systems are Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005 
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neither separate nor merely interactive but are mutually determining.  This 
I first explore through several dualisms, propositions each of which is true 
but which state conflicting points: 
i.   Law is a function of the economy; the economy is a function 
of law. 
ii.  Private is a function of public; public is a function of 
private. 
iii.   Property rights: their private exercise is in part the basis of 
their ratification by government, through governmental 
choice, such that private exercise is a function of 
government; government is in part a function of the private 
exercise. 
iv.   Government “protection of property”: property is protected 
because it is property; property is property because it is pro-
tected. 
 
I continue my introduction with the identification of an initial 
problem:  which differences in approach are due to the nature of the subject 
matter itself, and which are due to varying world-views, varying ideologies, 
varying analytical techniques and varying logics of modeling being 
superimposed on the subject matter?  The subject matter has many, and 
many changing, facets and can be viewed differently from varying 
perspectives, and is in fact viewed differently from varying perspectives.  
Each different perspective tells, or is used to tell, a more or less different 
story.  The sources or bases of variation include different conceptions of 
law, economy, the relation of the individual to law and to the economy, 
commodities; etc.  Different paradigms generate different modes of 
discourse; and different modes of discourse generate different paradigmatic 
accounts of the relevant social world (what is relevant varying from 
approach to approach).  Accordingly, there are different views as to what a 
theory of law and economics should do or try to do. 
Three different sets of paradigms are identified:  With regard to 
society as a whole:  harmony versus conflict.  With regards to distribution: 
productivity, exploitation, appropriation.  With regard to man and reality: 
free will and determinism.   
With regard to determinism I explain the relevance of philosophical 
and scientific realism.  I make the point that the realist ends up in much the 
same position as the idealist, namely, having to choose, because even if 
everyone was a realist (philosophical or scientific) they would still disagree 
as to the content of reality.  With regard to free will, I argue that it takes 
place within institutional and other constraints. Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005  11
Apropos of all of the foregoing, I suggest that much of what one can 
read amounts to legitimization, either of particular arrangements or of the 
system as such.   
One principal point is that we should differentiate the world of “real” 
fundamentals from the world of ideological perception and manipulation, 
or from perceptions superimposed on the real world, by which real world is 
made sense of and with which it is changed.  In the domain of law, one can 
juxtapose practice laden with ideology to technique, with the latter also 
laden with ideology, in part through implicit ideological premises.   
A second principal point is that the multiplicity of approaches, 
ideological positions, and definitions of reality yield the fact and 
importance of an inexorable bargaining process in which pragmatic 
solutions are worked out.  The idea of things being worked out is a 
centerpiece of my approach to the economic role of government.  And at 
the heart of the process of working things out are multiple selective 
perceptions and multiple definitions of reality, such that a necessity of 
choice characterizes and drives the working-out process. 
This brings me to the problem of defining versus creating social 
“reality”.  Law provides, and is predicated upon, a definition of social 
reality; law also is a system of social control functioning in the creation of 
social reality.  Law is not only social control; it also functions as psychic 
balm in the face of existential and social ambiguity and uncertainty.  We 
thus next encounter the problem of whether law-common-law rules, 
legislation, constitution-is found or made.  The successful legitimization of 
the legal system and of law in general, plus not unrelated belief in a “higher 
law” accounts for the idea that law is found, being transcendent to anything 
man can make.  This problem parallels that in theology as to how much is 
due to God and how much, if anything, is due to man.   
Within the problem of defining reality is another, namely, decision 
making and/or legitimization by appeal to the intentions of the “founding 
fathers.”  That term relates to those who framed the Constitution, though it 
can alternatively relate to those who ratified the proposed Constitution.   
Invocation of the founding fathers is a rhetorical stratagem, a means of 
establishing privileged status for the views selectively attributed to them.  
The entire exercise can be critiqued on several grounds, for example, why 
the present generation need be bound by the definition of reality and the 
legal rules purportedly held by an earlier generation, and the 
historiographic difficulties of identifying past belief systems without 
selectively projecting present beliefs. 
It is important for analytical purposes to contemplate law as choice 
and apropos the definition of reality projected by law, to identify the use of 
pretence as social control and legitimization. Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005 
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Law must be seen as language.  Legal concepts are embodied in words 
that are selectively defined and selectively applied.  These concepts and 
words are used in the process of defining and (re)making economy and 
society, as if words had independent meaning which we were trying to 
achieve.  The legal system and the economy are artifacts, both influencing 
and influenced by concepts ensconced in words.  On the one hand, we 
encounter reification, or the fallacy of misplaced concreteness or the 
naturalistic fallacy, namely treat what is materially an artifact as if it were 
part of the natural order of things.  On the other hand, we encounter the 
multiple possible readings of the texts of constitutions, legislation and court 
decisions.  We also encounter, in both, the importance of belief system and 
selective perception in working out the substantive content of law and the 
legitimization of law and legal system. 
 
2.  FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL-ECONOMIC PROCESSES: THE 
 LEGAL-ECONOMIC  NEXUS 
This section examines the basic models used in my approach to the 
economic role of government.  These models are then used in several 
paradigmatic case studies, after which I again identify the principal points I 
am trying to make.  The sequence of models has varied over time. 
 
2.1  First Model: The Problem of Order 
The Problem of Order requires that the student temporarily, for analytical 
purposes, suspend belief in certain of his or her own deeply held notions or 
beliefs.  The problem of order posits and deconstructs the fact of the 
continuing resolution in society of the conflicts between freedom (or 
autonomy) and control, between continuity and change, and between 
equality and hierarchy.  The problem of order is not resolved for mankind; 
it must be worked out, in a continuing manner, by mankind.   
Comprehending the foregoing elements of the model of the problem of 
order is complicated by the fact that each term can be defined and applied 
differently:  freedom, control, continuity, change, equality and hierarchy 
are all subject to selective perception, in part, perhaps in large part, 
influenced by how they are worked out in the society in which we live.  
Each conflict is complex and subtle, as each term is given selective 
meaning and application.  Among the further points that I make are (1) the 
economy is a structure of freedom and control; (2) change can be most 
fundamentally change in the structure of power (freedom and control); (3) 
continuity can mean continuity of the established model of change, rather 
than continuity of specific arrangements; (4) law is both a mode of 
continuity (conservation) and a mode of change, that latter comprising the 
legal change of law (change of law  by law, or adopting L
2 to replace L
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(5) the necessary comparison of libertarian with order conservatism, and of 
economic with social conservatism, illustrating the possibility for selective 
perception and selective application with regard to social control as for or 
against individual freedom of choice vis-à-vis some concept of right or just 
behavior or structure. 
 
2.2  Second Model: Market Plus Framework 
In the Market Plus Framework approach the market is seen as operation 
within a framework of legal and nonlegal social control.  One problem-
whose resolution is an object of the concept of the legal-economic nexus-is 
that of the separateness of market and framework.  In any event, the market 
is comprehended as in part the product of legal and moral social control, 
i.e., as an institution that is a function of other institutions which both 
structure and operate through the market.  A larger model, centering on the 
fuller explication of the social construction of the market, would 
incorporate Coase’s and Means’s theories of the firm, for example, yielding 
a more complex model of interaction.   
The nonlegal social controls include morals, religion, custom and 
education; the terms “nonlegal” and “morals” are used to include all four.  
Legal social controls involve a variety of sources of law; the terms “law” 
and “rights” are used to represent legal social control in its entirety.  The 
problems to be worked out include the substantive content of law and of 
morals; the relative weight of legal and nonlegal social controls; and 
whether and in what respects and how the framework is static or dynamic, 
(i.e. legal change of law and nonlegal change of morals, etc.).  A problem 
that is both conceptually and practically difficult is that of distinguishing 
between “framework filling” and other, nonframework filling, or 
“particularistic interventions” actions by government.  Unless agreement 
can be achieved over changes in property law and over the role of antitrust 
law, the distinction between framework and non framework filling actions 
is incoherent and useless except, potentially, for purposes of argument and 
of ideology, but always selectively. 
 
2.3  Third Model: Value Diagram 
Using a conventional production-possibility curve and social welfare 
function (and their tangency), I illustrate the simultaneous determination-
the working out-of four sets of variables: the values on the axes (the 
potential agenda items on which choice is exercised), the shape of the 
production possibility curve (e.g., what is done to influence how much can 
be produced and, giving effect to whose interests are protected as rights by 
the law, their cost), the preferences and their weighting by power structure 
to form the actual social welfare function hypothetically being formed here.  Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005 
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The emphasis is on the actual social welfare function, distinguished from 
some theoretically assumed social welfare function.  The main point is that 
lobbying, litigation, propaganda, and so on attempt to influence the values 
on the agenda, the shape of the production possibility curve, people’s 
preferences for the two values on the axes, and the power structure used in 
weighting preferences.  Thus the working out of the simultaneous 
determination of four sets of variable is shown, illustrating general 
interdependence, or cumulative causation.  Herein also resides the joint 
determination processes of individual utility maximization and of 
restructuring whose interests count through changes in law and therefore in 
rights. 
 
2.4  Fourth Model: Opportunity Set Model of Inter-agent 
 Relationships 
Here we have two circles, each representing the opportunity set at a point 
in time of two actors (or one actor and the sum of all other actors).  The 
scope or size of an individual’s opportunity set is a function of their power, 
here their legal rights; the choices made by an individual from within their 
extant opportunity set; and the impact of choices made by other individuals 
and/or by government.  Arrows are drawn between the two opportunity sets 
indicating the making of choices by some Alpha and their impact on the 
opportunity set of some Beta, when they are in the same field of action.  
Included in their respective opportunity sets is the right to petition (through 
litigation and/or lobbying) government to change the law in their interests.  
By power is meant participation in decision making and/or the bases 
thereof in law and legal rights.  The composition of individual opportunity 
sets and their respective places in the total structure of opportunity sets are 
two sides of the same phenomenon.  Choice from within an individual’s 
opportunity set is but one of the factors governing opportunity set structure 
and therefore the distribution of welfare.  The individual’s opportunity set 
is both a dependent and an independent variable.  This model is another but 
different way of illustrating general interdependence, or cumulative 
causation and therefore the joint operation of utility maximization and 
working out the structure of power (legal rights). 
I have found that this is a good point at which to identify and examine, 
first, certain principles of power, and second, certain dualisms of power.  
Among the principles of power are: 
i.  Power is necessary for desired ends. 
ii.  The quest for power is derived partly from the desire for 
particular ends, partly for “its own sake,” i.e., identity 
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iii.  The reciprocal character of power:  the power of Alpha is 
checked by the power of Beta, if both are in same field of 
power. 
a. The present concern is with zero-sum games.  Both 
positive- and negative-sum games exist.  Much of 
economic life is positive sum, often with cooperation 
in production a positive sum, and distribution of gains 
a zero-sum game.  Mainstream neoclassical economics 
is principally concerned with positive-sum games.   
Politics too is a combination of positive, zero-sum and 
negative games. 
iv.   The tendency is for the powerful to seek further power. 
v.   The tendency is for power to provide its own rationalization. 
vi.   Pluralism as goal requires a division of power as a check on 
power in order to diffuse power.  Different divisions of 
power yield different forms etc. of pluralism 
a.   Policies ostensibly to diffuse power can under certain 
circumstances operate, and be intended to operate, to 
concentrate power. 
Among the dualisms or paradoxes of power are: 
i.    Decisions are a function of power structure and power 
structure is a function of decisions. 
ii.   The working rules of law and morals govern the distribution 
and exercise of power and the distribution and exercise of 
power govern the development of the working rules. 
iii.   Values depend upon the decision making process and the 
decision making process depends upon values. 
iv.   Income and wealth distributions are a function of law and 
law is a function of income and wealth distributions. 
 
2.5 Fifth Model: Policy as Function of Power, Knowledge and 
 Psychology  Variables 
This model greatly reflects Vilfredo Pareto’s general social equilibrium 
analysis but is presented in the form of a modern restatement and is also to 
be found, with various differences in the works of others. 
a.   Definitions of terms: 
i.   Power: participation in decision making and the bases 
thereof, especially legal rights. 
ii.    Knowledge: that which is taken to be a credible 
definition of reality and thereby a credible basis of 
policy; may or may not constitute “hard” knowledge; 
also our definition of values. 
iii.   Psychology: psychic state and/or structure. Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005 
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b.   Three sets of variables 
i.   Interaction within each 
ii.   Interaction between the three 
a.   General interdependence 
b.   Cumulative causation  
c.   Joint determination 
c.   Each is subject to variable structuring and interpretation. 
d.   Propositions made in terms of one of the three typically can 
be restated in terms of another(s). 
e.    Any phenomenon can be interpreted in terms of one or 
another of the three. 
i.   Profound  interpretive  problem: relative explanatory 
importance in particular cases. 
f.   Pareto’s own broadest model, stated in modern terms:  See 
Warren J. Samuels, Pareto on Policy (Elsevier 1974). 
g.   Ubiquitous aspects and elements of normative choice. 
h.   Selective perception of power, freedom, coercion, 
government. 
i. Herbert  Simon,  Reason in Human Affairs, 1983: “In 
our society, we have an unfortunate habit of labeling 
our political institutions in two different ways.  On the 
days when we are happy with them, we call them 
democracy; on the days when we are unhappy with 
them we call them politics.  We don’t choose to 
recognize that `politics,’ used in that pejorative way, is 
simply a label for some of the characteristics of our 
democratic political institutions that we happen not to 
fancy.  Neither ‘politics’ nor ‘democracy’ wholly 
describes those institutions, and we solve no problems 
by labeling their wanted and unwanted aspects in this 
particular way” (p. 99).   He is wrong at the end:   
labeling does channel problem solutions, selectively.   
He is correct, however, in his subsequent identification 
of those participating in the political process as 
`politicians’ even though “For them, `politician’ was 
simply a cussword, a term they couldn’t imagine 
applying to themselves.  . . . we must recognize that 
certain kinds of political phenomena--the attempt to 
influence legislation or the administration of laws, the 
advocacy of special interest--are essential to the 
operation of political institutions in a society where 
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most people are expected to pay some attention to their 
own private interests” (p. 100). 
•  Problem of the role of the expert:  political. 
•  Problem of technical versus subjective solutions. 
ii.  Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski, April 5, 
1917:  “… what we call the interest of the public is 
little more than a phrase.  We invoke it against labor in 
a situation like that in the threatened railroad strike but 
when the roads ask for a 15% increase in rates we are 
singularly quiet about it.”  (Holmes-Laski Letters, 
Mark DeWolfe Howe, ed., Cambridge, MA:  Harvard 
University Press, 1953, p. 76) 
•  Normative judgment always required. 
•  The problem is to recognize that it is involved—
versus absolutist legitimization. 
i.   Knowledge: has to do with our definition of reality and of 
values 
i.   Definition of the problem:  what one expects, defines 
as possible, desirable. 
ii.   The scope and ordering of variables 
iii.   That which is accepted as given 
iv.   The tautological character of reasoning 
v.   The choice of alternative models and paradigms 
vi.   Reliance on myths, symbols, metaphors, ideology: 
a.   Generalized, a priori, efficient ready-made 
solutions 
i.   generally still subject to selective perception 
vii.   Heterogeneous character of knowledge at any point in 
time 
a.   Problem of choice of knowledge per se, as basis 
of policy choice 
b.   Policy or problem solutions tend to be tautological 
with definition of problem 
c.   What people believe is often more important than 
what they should believe; it is the former which 
they act upon 
viii.    Reality of manipulation of information flows-what 
politics is in part about: manipulation of political 
psychology by manipulation of information 
j.   Psychology: Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005 
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i.    Horney: complex postures consisting of withdrawal, 
aggression, compliance; alternatively, grandiose or 
constrained view of self 
ii.   Freud: 
a.    Posture as to frustration and authority, and 
therefore as to continuity and change, freedom 
and control, hierarchy and equality: through 
resolution of Oedipal and adolescent conflicts 
b.   Each individual a blend of complex psychic states 
and motivations: capable of being selectively 
reinforced and weakened; exposed to multiplicity 
of competing pressures 
iii.   Personal  identities  and  attachments with psychic 
meaning, thus specific content regarding freedom and 
control, etc.:  subject to manipulation through 
contrived or selective identification as freedom or 
control 
k. Power:  (in addition to supra) 
a.   Power and public finance 
i.    Structure of power and distributions of income 
and wealth as focus 
a.   Conflicts over these are at the heart of public 
finance:  “shifting taxing from me to thee, 
and spending from thee to me” 
ii.   Examples of recognition in public finance 
literature: (sources from Land Economics, vol. 48 
(August 1972), pp. 256, 262) 
a.   John Maurice Clark: government becoming 
“more frankly a vehicle through which 
groups may directly promote their particular 
economic interests” 
b.   Gustav  Schmoller: “The higher economic 
classes have always understood more or less 
how to develop customs and laws in their 
favor, how thereby to increase their incomes 
and their property, how to give themselves 
an advantage in commercial intercourse.   
The middle classes have to a certain extent 
attempted the same thing, as opposed to the 
upper classes.  Their success has been 
variable.  The lower classes have always 
been most unfavorably situated for that sort 
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c.   Arthur Cecil Pigou:  “Adam Smith’s 
invisible hand is not an external fate taking 
precedence over political institutions, but 
does its job, well or ill, only because these 
institutions have been framed, maybe in the 
interests of a ruling class or clique, maybe 
for the general good, to control and direct its 
movements.” 
d.   Rudolf  Goldscheid:   “The rising bourgeois 
classes wanted a poor State, a State 
depending for its revenue on their good 
graces, because these classes knew their own 
power to depend upon what the State did or 
did not have money for … [This] leads to 
something like a State within the State and 
this becomes the real State in the place of 
that which is declared as such by the formal 
legal order and its sham moral trimmings. … 
The State became the instrument of the 
ruling classes by the fiscal organization 
which they imposed upon it.  Capitalists have 
used the public household on the largest 
scale to enhance their profits and extend their 
power since capitalism has emerged 
triumphant in the form of finance capital.” 
e.   Joseph A. Schumpeter:  “The kind and level 
of taxes are determined by the social 
structure, but once taxes exist they become a 
handle, as it were, which social powers can 
grip in order to change this structure.”  “… it 
is, however, decisive for a realistic 
understanding of the phenomen [sic] of the 
state to recognize the importance of that 
group of persons in whom it assumes social 
form, and of those factors which gain 
domination over it.  This explains the state’s 
real power and the way in which it is used 
and developed.” 
iii. Samuelson,  Newsweek, January 7, 1974, p. 58 
a.    Politics is economics carried on by other 
means 
b.    Economics is also politics carried on by 
other means Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005 
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iv.   Economic role of government as aspect of 
problem of order 
 
The following preliminary paradigmatic case studies have these functions: 
to apply the foregoing models and to extend and strengthen our insights 





2.6  First Preliminary Paradigmatic Case Study 
1.   Upstream steel plant, downstream shrimp plant, further downstream 
flower grower. 
2.   Dual nature of rights and reciprocal character of externalities:  realized 
externality as a function of rights. 
a.  Rights determination does not generate costs, only their 
distribution. 
3.    Shrimp plant as recipient of externalities (waste from steel plant: 
negative externality) and as generator of externalities (waste from 
shrimp plant a positive externality (enriched water) for flower 
grower). 
a.   If add public beach further downstream, can envision all three 
upstream producers generating negative externalities). 
4. Regulation  determining rights and externalities contrasted with 
government clean-up. 
a.   Government does not generate costs, only their distribution: one 
party or another, or taxpayer-supplied general funds 
b.   “Inflation” argument fallacious: costs newly borne by polluters 
lowers costs of hitherto polluters. 
5.   Fundamental conceptions: 
a.   Dual nature of rights 
b.   Reciprocal nature of externalities 
c.  Status quo point 
i.   Ambiguous and heterogeneous character of status quo 
ii.   Selective perception 
iii.   Status quo point and realized externality 
d.   Complex valorization-registration in market 
i.    Critique of idea that externalities are costs (benefits) not 
internalized in market 
e.   Non-unique Pareto optimal results 
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2.7  Second Paradigmatic Case Study: Pregnancy Leaves 
 
This case illustrates the several different modes of generating rights: (1) 
private contract, company policy, collective bargaining; (2) legislation 
mandating coverage; (3) equal protection clause (for mother, or for father, 
or both). 
 
2.8  Third Paradigmatic Case Study: Red Cedar Case, 1928 
 
a.   Summary of case 
b.   Aspects: 
i. Inexorable necessity of choice faced by legislature 
ii.   Technological solution-and possible further externality and rights 
problems 
iii.   Large versus small numbers and organizational costs: regarding 
right to redress grievances to legislature and/or courts 
iv.  Structure of mutual coercion 
a.   Non-unique Pareto optimality 
i.   Different power structures lead to different resources 
and efficient results 
ii.   Noncomparable 
v.   Meanings of “intervention” 
a.   Intrusion of government into situation in which it hitherto 
had been absent 
b.   Legal change of legal rights, thus of the interests to which 
government lends its support 
vi.   Conflicts of philosophies of “property” 
 
2.9 The  Legal-Economic  Nexus 
This concept, proposed as fundamental but difficult to articulate using 
conventional terminology, portrays political-governmental-legal and 
economic-market processes as not fully separate, self-subsistent orders, but 
rather as constituting twin aspects of a fundamental legal-economic nexus 
in which polity and economy are mutually defining and which arise out of a 
common process. 
 
2.10 Some Fundamental Points 
These points are intended to reiterate, perhaps restate from a different 
angle, and to extend the foregoing discussions, as well as to provide a 
summary of the foregoing discussion. 
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1.   Law as part of social (re)construction of economy 
2.  Economics as part of social (re)construction of economy and of law 
3.   a.   Platonic element:  derivation of ideal as basis and target of policy 
        b.  Aristotelian element: what is fundamental independent of 
 selective  perception,  subjectivity, and normativism 
4.   Paradoxical intertemporal characteristics of law and legal process: 
a.   Ex post nature of common and constitutional law 
b.   Precedential mode of discourse 
c.   Futurist nature of law:  governs rights and relationships in future 
d.    Public good nature of law, e.g., court decisions:  non-
  excludability and zero marginal cost of additional members of 
 group 
5.  Critical importance of status quo point:  dual nature of rights, 
reciprocal character of externalities:  governs whose interests are to 
count and distribution of benefits and sacrifice, e.g., realized 
externalities 
6.  Critical role of selective perception, e.g., selective identification of 
actual or hypothetical status quo 
7.  Dual meaning of intervention:  intrusion into situation in which 
government has hitherto been absent, versus legal change of interests 
to which government effectively gives its support 
8.  “Government” as legal change 
9.  Fundamental importance of government in status quo:  George Will 
column, 2 March 1981: 
Reagan:   
“The taxing power of government must . . . not be used to 
regulate the economy or bring about social change.” 
Will:  
“Oh?  The choice of any tax program is a choice from a 
large universe of alternatives.  Any tax program has special 
social consequences; it raises some revenues rather than 
others, encourages and discourages particular behavior.  And 
rarely has there been a clearer, bolder, more self-conscious 
attempt than Reagan’s to use the tax system as a lever for 
moving society in the direction of desired change.  But 
American conservatives are addicted to the pose of hostility 
to government power, so they systematically misdescribe 
their own attempts to use government energetically.  
When, Oh Lord, shall we be delivered from the 
conservatives’ pretense that they, unlike liberals, do not 
believe in using government to promote their values through 
social change?  If that were true, there would be no point in 
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10.  Economy is an object of legal control and law is an instrument of 
economic gain-advantage (law as an economic alternative and as 
object of control and use). 
a.   Law as social control and as power player 
b.  Law as control and as object of control 
11.   Principle of the use of government: an instrument available to 
whomever can control it 
12.   Government: 
a.   Diverse Approaches: 
i.    Government as an exogenous black box (perfect; 
nondecisional): `slot machine theory of justice’ 
ii.   Government as a neutral extension or aggregation of private 
choice  
iii.   Government as nonneutral decision-making or preference-
aggregating process 
iv.   Government as an instrument of the powerful, e.g., ruling 
class 
v.    Government as an instrument with which to check the 
power of the powerful 
a.   Whether government is to be used to reinforce power 
of the already powerful, or on behalf of the powerless 
to check the power of the powerful, the powerful and 
the powerless owe their respective existing positions in 
part to other, past actions of government 
vi.  Government as the source of problems, if not of evil, in 
society 
vii.   Government as the source of progress 
viii.    Government as part of the necessary framework of the 
market 
ix.   Preference aggregation process 
x.   Government functions to serve the `public interest’ 
xi.  Government as a matter of the self-interest of politicians (as 
distinct from self-interest, or something else, of all citizens) 
xii.   Government a complex decision-making process; not a 
single entity (no more “the government” than “the market”) 
xiii. Governance as the sum of private and public governments 
xiv.  Government as both dependent and independent, interactive 
variable 
b.   Complex Personal Approach 
i.   An arena of power and power play 
ii.   Value clarification process 
iii.   Government as social control or power player, or both 
simultaneously Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005 
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iv.   Institution of collective action:  mechanism of social welfare 
function formation and change:  mechanism and process 
v.   “Collective bargaining state” 
vi.   Politics as mode of self-government 
vii.   Government as dependent and independent variable 
viii.  Law taking versus law making 
ix.   Determination  of  economic  role of government versus 
determination of substantive content thereof 
x.   Principle of use of government 
xi.   Central focus on legal change of law 
xii.  Governance:  private and public government 
13.   Government is important in definition, creation and structuring of 
economy, as such requires normative direction 
a.  Most discussion of economic role of government is part of, 
contribution to, participant in, process of working out necessary 
normative direction 
b.   Critical role of social belief system 
c.   Centrality of power:  power in government, power in economy, 
the determination of power in each, the mutual interaction, and 
especially the simultaneous and/or mutual definition of economic 
and political power 
d.   Critical role of selective perception 
e.   Key empirical problem:  legal change of law 
f.    Efforts are continually being made to obfuscate the role of 
government so as to selectively channel the re-definition and re-
creation of the economy 
14. Conceptualizations: some  “primitive” terms necessarily given 
substance in practice: 
a.   Law, economy, private, public, property, free enterprise, regulate, 
deregulate, commodity, product definitions, economic units 
(“individual”), costs (whose interests count as cost to others, 
through rights) 
i.  More detailed examination later 
ii.  Using any of these terms as found in existential practice (1) 
begs questions, (2) is often ambiguous, permitting selective 
perception and application, (3) gives effect to much other 
relevant law 
iii.  These are not natural, real, or independent of social practice; 
most are insubstantial symbols created and given episodic, 
selective meaning in practice 
b.  Diversity of constitutional “readings”. 
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3. ECONOMIC  ROLE  OF GOVERNMENT / LAW AND 
  ECONOMICS IN THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 
3.1 Historical  Overview 
1.   Old and fundamental topic 
a.    Can argue that treatment of law, or of law and economics, in 
history of economics has been channeled by (i) fundamental 
conception of economy, (ii) preconception with contemporary 
agenda for government, (iii) efforts, deliberative or otherwise, to 
protect or change distributions of income, wealth and opportunity, 
as well as control of government 
b.   Critical to society 
i.  Basis and/or target of ideologies 
ii.  Considerable literature prior to last thirty years:  legal 
writers, economists 
c.    Overview is highly abbreviated; intended to give flavor, not 
provide comprehensive treatment 
2.   Locke, Physiocrats, English Classical Economists 
a.   Conflicting interpretations, e.g., English Classical Economists 
b.   Each had greater economic role for government than commonly 
recognized: Due to (1) ignorance, (2) taking certain things for 
granted and not considering them governmental in character, (3) 
promulgation and effect of dominant ideology 
3.    Considerable literature on relationships between legal and market-
economic processes during century prior to 1960 (date of publication 
of Coase’s classic article) 
a.    A central focus of institutional economics:  Henry Carter 
Adams’s  Economics and Jurisprudence, Richard T. Ely’s 
Property and Contract in their Relation to the Distribution of 
Wealth, Commons’s Legal Foundations of Capitalism, John 
Maurice Clark’s Social Control of Business 
b.  Multiplicity of articles by economists and by lawyers (legal 
realism, e.g. Walton Hamilton); very rich analyses 
i.   Approaches: 
a.   Economy as a function of law 
b.   Law as a function of economy 
c.   Nexus with interrelations 
d.   Market plus framework 
4.   Within the neoclassical mainstream: 
a.   Pigovian: reformist; requires assumption re whose interests are to 
count, in determining which/whose externality is to be realized, 
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b.   Paretian: antireformist; requires assumption pro status quo rights 
and consequences thereof 
5.   Marxian 
a.    State as instrument of domination and exploitation in class 
society 
i.   Role of private property 
ii.  Instrument of rule, making law in interest of the powerful 
iii.   A class instrument, with direct and indirect control of 
government 
iv.   Level and structure of government budgets determined by 
“who rules” and by conflicts within and between classes and 
groups 
b.   Functions: 
i.    Legitimization and reproduction of system and of power 
structure 
ii.   Abet private capital accumulation 
c.   Conflict between 
i.   Legitimization needs of system, through welfare state, even 
if token, and 
ii.   Facilitation of accumulation 
d.   Internal, inherent conflicts within capitalism generate spending 
for military, education and welfare, with regard to: 
i.   Legitimation of system and reproduction of social relations 
(class structure) 
ii. Imperialism 
iii.   Buying off poor and avoiding revolution 
iv.   Countering economic instability 
v.   Conflicts within capitalist class over distribution of surplus 
value 
vi.   Conflicts between capital and labor re generation of surplus 
value 
vii.   Increasing socialization of private costs of business, e.g., 
pollution clean-up 
e.   Growth of public spending due to (1) growing concentration of 
capitalist power and its use of the state, and (2) growth of crises 
and conflicts within capitalism (economic instability and labor-
capital conflicts), with spending growth a reflection of conflict 
and functioning to dampen class conflict, e.g., welfare state 
f.   More recent Marxian work deemphasizes class control and sees 
state as power center, more or less autonomous, functioning to 
reinforce dominant interests by virtue of its role to promote 
viability and stability of system, a field of power balance of and 
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6.   New developments, last thirty years or so 
a. Neoclassical-Chicago 
i.   Search for “optimal” law, rights, problem solutions 
ii.   Interpretation of legal history and operation of legal system 
per market analogs, e.g., transaction costs 
a. Ronald  Coase 
iii.   Law as maximization of value of output (wealth) 
a.   Richard Posner 
b. Institutionalist 
i.   Description and interpretation of how legal system works 
out fundamental problems 
ii.   Problem solving strategies 
iii.   Given diagnosis of dominant corporate system:  planning or 
return to market? 
c.   Marxism 
i.  State as autonomous rather than deliberative 
ii.  Success of dominant ideology and of repression accounts 
for increasing conservatism of population   
d.   Critical legal studies movement 
i.   Combination of legal realism and Marxism in law, but also 
more than that 
a.   Viet Nam and civil rights era radicalism extended 
7.   Some key, albeit controversial, points: 
a.   Basic economic institutions function law 
b.   Principle of use of government (political capitalism) 
c.   Dual nature of rights + reciprocal nature of externalities, imply 
(a) ubiquitous and inevitable externalities, (b) necessity of 
choice, (c) ambivalent attitudes toward government 
8.   Law school:   
a.   Trade school, for many: learning a profession 
b.   Intellectual journey re critical role of law and of government in 
regard to the economy 
c.  “Training in `socialism’”-by some definitions of socialism 
 
4.  OF LAW AND RIGHTS 
A.  Law as Language 
1.   Concepts embodied in words, selectively defined and selectively 
applied:  e.g., “property” 
2.      Used in the process of defining and (re)making economy and 
society, as if words had independent meaning which we were 
trying to achieve Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005 
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3.    Legal system and economy are artifacts, influencing and yet 
influenced by concepts ensconced in words 
4.   Fallacy of misplaced concreteness:  reification 
a.   Determinism and foreclosure of process 
5.   Multiple possible readings of texts 
B.  Constitutional and Legal Juxtapositions and Conflicts 
1.   Diversity of constitutional readings 
a.   Conflicts of constitutional clauses, e.g., commerce clause vs 
5th and 14th Amendments 
2.   Diversity of readings of common law precedential sequences 
a.    A matter of where one is going to draw the line, or the 
selective application of one legal principle of clause rather 
than another 
3.    Texts combined with varying valuational paradigms regarding 
how economy and society should be organized and operated 
4.    Sometimes a matter of defining rights as if they existed 
independent of government and limiting law (in which case law 
“takes” rather than “makes” law), or as inclusive of such law 
a.   Will discuss taking issue and compensation problem later 
b.   Eminent domain versus police power (“petty larceny” of the 
police power; compare Epstein) 
5.   Some “primitive” terms necessarily given substance in practice 
by law: 
a.    Law, economy, private, public, property, free enterprise, 
regulate, deregulate, commodity/product definitions, 
economic units, costs (whose interests count as cost to 
others) 
C.    Complex Intertemporal Characteristics of Law 
1.   Futurist nature of law:  governs rights and relations in future 
2.   Ex post nature of common and constitutional law 
a.  Belief in/pretense of “discovering” “pre-existing” law 
3.   Public good nature of law, e.g., court decisions re compass of 
adjudicated rights 
4.   Constitutional and legal juxtapositions and conflicts: 
a.   District Court judge imprisoning a lawyer for contempt of 
court; absolute authority or check via habeas corpus to 
another court 
b.    British Official Secrets Act re national security, versus 
perceived necessities of a free society and protection from 
government malfeasance and corruption 
c.   U.S. Constitution:  constitutional juxtapositions:  delegated 
powers versus limitations in amendments (and in original 
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i.   Diversity of constitutional readings 
ii.   Same regarding common law precedential sequences:  
necessity and fact of choice 
a.   A matter of where one is going to draw the line, 
or the selective application of one legal principle 
or clause rather than another 
b.    E.g., a matter of defining rights independent of 
governing and limiting law (in which case law 
`takes”), or as inclusive of such law 
i.    E.g., eminent domain versus police power 
(`petty larceny’ of the police power; compare 
Epstein) 
a.   Define police power, eminent domain 
b.    Mugler vs Kansas, state can regulate 
without paying compensation (Holmes-
Laski, p. 473) 
d.    Proposed ordinance requiring two people on duty in all-
night groceries, to deter robberies:  effectiveness issue (30% 
reduction in one case); another issue:  said to conflict with 
“free enterprise” 
e.    Aforementioned problem of pregnancy leaves:  modes of 
generating rights: private contract, legislation, equal 
protection clause [for mother, or for father, or both] 
f.   Running a university, or a business:  what is governed by 
employment contract, by practice of managerial hierarchy, 
by law (statute, court decisions); what can be changed 
unilaterally, what by majority vote: re faculty, students 
i.    English case, Poplar, House of Lords sustained 
determination of a District Auditor that wages of 
municipal employees should be reduced as the cost of 
living declined; c. 1925 (Holmes-Laski, p. 808) 
a.  what does employment contract explicitly call 
for? 
b.   In what legal context is it interpreted? 
ii.   Standardized contracts ‘of adhesion’ 
g.   Concept of “sovereignty”   
i.    Applicable to polity and economy; can take a 
sociological view as well as legal:  property as 
sovereignty 
ii.    Problem of governmental liability:  Kawananakoa v. 
Polyblank, 1907:  “A sovereign is exempt from suit, 
not because of any formal conception or obsolete 
theory, but on the logical and practical ground that Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005 
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there can be no legal right as against the authority that 
makes the law on which the right depends.” 
iii.   Issues: 
a.   Liability per se 
b.   Given legislature can establish liability, can court 
impose it?:  legislature vs judiciary in law making 
c.   Desirability  versus  a  matter of logical necessity 
(e.g., that the source of law should be subject to 
the law that it makes, unless it chooses to say that 
it will be:  Holmes) 
d.    Any difference whether sovereign is king or 
people? 
i.   Argument that the English king in the 13th 
century both sued and was sued as a private 
person, and that non-suability was mainly a 
Tudor-Stuart doctrine very largely due to 
influence of Renaissance theories of 
sovereignty (and, arguably, desire to avoid 
liability)  
e.    Whether sovereignty is anything more than a 
balance of forces, a matter of policy and power 
and how far the strongest will stand the others 
i.    “every ultimate repository of ultimate 
political power de facto has limits beyond 
which it cannot go because the people would 
fight  . . . the ultimate source of law when 
you find it, is subject to such laws or 
resolutions only as it chooses to impose upon 
itself, from a legal point of view, and that 
therefore the State is not subject to legal 
claims except so far as it sees fit to submit 
itself to them” - Holmes (Holmes-Laski, p. 
183) 
ii.   Comments: 
a.   Much metaphysics here 
b.   Practical matter in face of rebellion or 
threat thereof 
i.    Did English Parliament have the 
right to legislate for the American 
colonies? the power? (Holmes-
Laski, p. 616) 
c.   Government a process of working this 
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d. Residue of medieval monarchical 
government 
e.   Universal “tort” liability of government 
f.   Government as mode of determining its 
scope, function, and liability—though 
in larger context 
f.   Are courts part of government in respect to the 
legislature as ‘sovereign’?:  Holmes:  
 
“. . . as to sovereignty, because as I understand the question it 
seems to me one that does not admit of argument.  The thing to 
which I refer has nothing to do with the difficulty of finding out 
who the sovereign is, or the tacitly recognized de facto limits on 
the power of the most absolute sovereign that ever was.  The 
issue is on the decision that you criticize, and even narrower than 
that.  If you should say that the Courts ought in these days to 
assume a consent of the U.S. to be sued, or to be liable in tort on 
the same principle as those governing private persons, I should 
have my reason for thinking you wrong, but should not care, as 
that would be an intelligible point of difference.  But what I can’t 
understand is the suggestion that the United States is bound by 
law even though it does not assent.  What I mean by law in this 
connection is that which is or should be enforced by the Courts 
and I can’t understand how anyone should think that an 
instrumentality established by the United States to carry out its 
will, and that it can depose upon a failure to do so, should 
undertake to enforce something that ex hypothesi is against its 
will.  It seems to me like shaking one’s fist at the sky, when the 
sky furnishes the energy that enables one to raise the fist.  There 
is a tendency to think of judges as if they were independent 
mouthpieces of the infinite, and not simply directors of a force 
that comes from the source that gives them their authority.” 
(Holmes-Laski, p. 822)  
i.   This is of course the very point at issue:  who 
declares law as an exercise of sovereignty?  
Yet, Holmes is best known for his statement 
that the law is not a brooding omnipresence 
in the sky (Holmes-Laski, pp. 776, 6n4, 190, 
380, 68, 74, 183, 822, 896, 940). 
g.   `Sovereignty’ as metaphor—but for what? 
h.    Student newspaper case (reporting on 
consequences of pregnancy and divorce):  facets, 
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i.   Privacy 
ii.   Educational policy 
iii.   Property right of school authorities 
iv.   Election control of school authorities 
v.    Behavioral consequences for student 
journalists 
vi.   Free speech 
i.    Class location:  instructor unilateral change of 
location regarding (1) differential situs and 
proximity, (2) air conditioning 
j.   Green v. Frazier 1920, sustained as constitutional 
North Carolina taxing statutes designed to make 
possible the financing of public control of the 
manufacturing and marketing of farm products 
(Holmes-Laski, p. 263n3) 
D.  Law.  The foregoing discussion has used the concept of “law” as a 
primitive term.  I now examine the various meanings of law with a 
view toward what law is, what law does, and what is readily 
obfuscated by unexamined or non-deconstructed uses of the term.  I 
commence with restating the ubiquity of law and examining the 
nature, differences between, and commonalities of common and civil 
law systems.  The array of common (court) law, constitutional (court), 
statutory and administrative law is then rehearsed.  Given these 
different sources or forms of law, I then discuss the topics necessarily 
examined in order to further and more deeply deconstruct the meaning 
of “law.” 
1.   Divine, natural, and positive law 
a.   Law as something given, antecedent, preeminent to man 
b.   Law as a creation of human decision making processes, with 
varying forms and structures of participation 
c.    The misleading conventional view that the legislature 
makes, the executive enforces, and the judiciary interprets 
“the law” 
i.   Equally  misleading,  though conflicting, is the 
conventional view that law is found, not made 
d.   Law as process, rather than a “fact:”  a system and not a 
working-back to some a priori system of rights, or 
something to which state must seek to conform; rather, 
something to be worked out 
e.   The inevitability of the normative nature of law; a political 
(having to do with power and choice) phenomenon 
i.   Contrast with pretense of given law, as if in the same 
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a.    Legitimization:  to coerce acceptance, in part 
through reification  
b.   Psychic balm:  widespread longing for a natural, 
depoliticized existence 
ii.   Two conceptions of “politicize:”   
a.  Putting something into politics which was not 
hitherto in politics 
b.   Making explicit as politics what was political all 
along 
c.    Parallels dual view of relation of property and 
other rights to police power:   
i.   Police power as external to rights—implies 
intrusion  
ii.    Police power as integral to rights per se—
does not imply intrusion 
f.    Naturalistic fallacy: treating what “is” as if it were real, 
natural in some absolute ontological sense; telescoping “is” 
and “ought” 
2.   Rights  
a.   As claims  
b.   As adjudicated conflicts who can do what to whom 
c.   As supportive/protective legal sanctions 
3.   Regarding common, court law:  what is the “law”? 
a.   The decisions 
b.   The ratio decidendi of case:  the ground of a decision, the 
basis of the holding 
c.   The precedential sequence, somehow interpreted 
d.    The overriding principle of rule of which the former are 
evidence of manifestations 
e.   The overarching rule or principle of which the former are 
manifestations or evidence 
f.   The natural law 
4.    Another approach: the law on paper/in action/prosecutorial, 
judicial and enforcement discretion 
5.   The sources of law:  (in part a function of definition of law) 
a. Custom 
i.   Problem of co-existing bodies of custom; necessity of 
choice 
ii.   Problem of custom as a function of the law vis-à-vis 
law as a function of custom 
b.   Morality and equity 
c.   Public policy 
d.   Statutes Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005 
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e.   Force (will of the sovereign, with sovereignty ultimately a 
matter of force) 
f.   Past judicial precedents (judicial authority) 
g.   Opinions of experts (academic etc. authority) 
h.   Legal theory (analytical jurisprudence):  logic 
i.   Nature of models and of logic 
a.   Nature of models, in relation to conclusions 
b.   Logic and truth:  Euclidian axiom 
ii.   Can one expect answers from logic alone?:  
a.   Which/whose premises 
b.   Holmes: law is logic and life, especially latter 
iii.  Can one base economic role of government on narrow 
theoretical limits pertaining to a static existence? 
a.   Why not, is done all the time; point is to recognize 
it 
6.   Sociological  jurisprudence/legal realism:  emphasis on 
experience and practice:  legal equivalent of Institutional 
Economics 
a.  Basic argument: arises within and on basis of experience 
b.   Experience requires norm- and theory-laden basis on which 
to be perceived 
c.   Problem  of  which/whose  experience, premises, goals, 
future:  a matter of power and policy 
d.   Problem of whether the law is an expression of a certain set 
of economic conditions 
i.   Yes: industrial capitalism 
ii.   No: which/whose interests are sacrificed to who else’s:  
have choice even within system or conditions 
e.    Tendency to make historical accounts produce categories 
and then use the categories as an explanation of the history; 
reification per absolutist legitimization, predisposition to 
determinism 
f.   Reality or premise of study: exercise of choice per se (legal 
realism, critical legal studies, institutionalist approach to law 
and economics) 
i.   Mainstream foci on: 
a.  Determinate policy solutions 
b.   Policy solutions deemed aprior optimal (efficient) 
c.   In both respects, obfuscating, and giving effect, to 
necessary premises re whose interests are to 
count, as rights 
7.    Theories of law, and of law and economics, become/are part of 
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a.   Treating constitutional text, or concept of property, as given 
or absolute, gives effect not to constitution but to 
interpretation given privileged status 
b.   Law is social control, and arena for conflict over privileged 
status to be given to interests; to identification, definition 
and application of rights; and to interpretation of language 
(common law and constitutional doctrines) 
8.   Law: as check on power, or as instrument of power: both 
a.   Law as persuasion re social control effects 
b.   Law as symbol manipulation 
i.   McCloskey: economics, too: market etc. as metaphor 
9.  Law/policy distinction evaporates 
a.    Pretense of law as given; policy as matter of choice; 
pretense of law as found, not made 
b.   Contexts: 
i.   Philosophical: law as policy matter: versus 
philosophical realism, scientific realism (applicable to 
law?) 
a.   Telescoping `is’ and `ought’ 
b.   Idealism versus realism, and inexorable necessity 
of choice 
ii.   Practical: division of power between legislature-
executive and courts; social control role: absolutist 
legitimization; psychic balm of powerful: deny power 
iii.   Controversy whether judges make or declare (find) law 
may be literally a waste of time, though controversy 
itself is facet of continuity versus change and power-
structure controversies in society (Holmes-Laski, p. 
590) 
10.  Law as choice/reasoning 
a.    Behind every body of law is an implicit body of 
metaphysical (normative) conceptualization re philosophy 
of law, society, interests -- usually economic system - or 
ideology-specific, e.g., transformation of common law from 
agrarian to urban business society 
b.   “General propositions do not decide concrete cases.  The 
decision will depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle 
than any articulate major premise.”  “But although practical 
men generally prefer to have their premises inarticulate, yet 
even for practical purposes theory generally turns out the 
most important thing in the end.”  Holmes (Holmes-Laski, 
p. 238n.7) Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005 
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i.   St. Thomas Aquinas: when reason comes to particular 
cases, reason needs not only general but particular 
principles 
E. Rights 
1.  Rights in General 
a.    Claim, affirmation of claim, means of protection and 
enforcement 
b.   `Rights’ as mode of discourse:  argument in terms of rights 
claims, typically when claim is point at issue 
i. Multiple models 
c.   Rights in Hohfeldian system 
d.    Rights in Hale-Samuels opportunity-set mutual-coercion 
model:  rights as basis of power 
e.   Rights as check on power, or as instrument of power 
f.   Statement that “X has right to”: 
i.    By court, it is an `is’ statement but represents an 
`ought’ re structure of decision making participation 
a.   Pretense of given law to be discovered 
b.   Telescopes is and ought 
i.    “That is not the law of England.”  “I am 
perfectly aware of it, but I am considering 
whether it should be the law of 
Massachusetts.”  (Holmes-Laski, p. 692) 
ii.   “It is the law.”  “I agree, and I am arguing 
that it ought not to be the law.”  “I assume 
that the House of Lords must be right.”   
(Holmes-Laski, p. 775) 
ii.   By participant, an `is’ statement 
iii.   Judging law by its intent (whose), its effects (multiple), 
or by its consonance with something absolute (whose 
interpretation/specification) 
iv.   Consistency problem:  impossible in problem-of-order 
context and re multiple principles 
g.    Significance of rights in context of other rights: relative, 
limited 
h.   De jure versus de facto rights 
i.   Paradox: 
i.    Rights as given, anterior to policy, and govern 
economic outcomes (minimized by Chicago 
orthodoxy) 
a.   Given by nature, by constitution? 
ii.    Use economic analysis to determine rights (Posner 
version of Chicago) Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005  37
j.   Aspects of property rights in economic analysis 
2. Property  rights 
a.   Objectives of discussion 
i.  Discuss the nature of property rights with a view to 
their use in economic analysis and the dispositiveness 
of issues by economic analysis 
ii.    Discuss specific role of property rights in economic 
analysis 
iii.   Deal with controversial fundamentals, hopefully in 
constructive manner, hopefully useful to audience 
likely to be more sophisticated about these matters than 
most economists 
b.   Nature of (Private) Property Rights 
i.   Property as power, meaning established participation in 
decision making, and bases of such participation 
a.    Rights as claims/protected interests/mode of 
protection 
ii.   Relative versus absolute nature of property 
a.   Bundle of rights 
i.    Relative to other rights, to governmental 
determination and limitations 
b.   Private versus public character of property rights 
and indeed all rights 
c.   Contingent, problematic economic significance of 
property rights  
d.   Transformation  of  nature and distribution of 
property rights 
i.   Smith: transformation from feudal to 
commercial property systems: economic 
stages, with property, government and law 
specific to each stage 
ii.   Horwitz, Nelson and others:  transformation 
of American law in 19th century 
iii.   Conflict and dynamics of property 
a.  Conflicts among property rights 
b.   Conflict  between property rights and 
competition 
c.   Dynamics:  Schumpeterian creative 
destruction 
i.   Endogenous process 
ii. Inevitability of noncompensated 
losses:  impossibility of Lockean Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005 
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approach (government exists to 
protect private property rights) 
a.   Reciprocal externalities 
d.    Conflicts between property rights and 
other rights (property right equivalents) 
iv.   Institution of property vis-à-vis particular 
details of property rights as to whose 
interests are so protected within general 
institution 
v.   Co-evolution of property and government 
e.   Property  as  whatever  interests are protected as 
property:  property is what is protected, not 
protected because it is property 
i.   Government always employed in aid of some 
interest; problem as to which/whose interest, 
not `no interest’ 
ii. `Nightwatchman’ theory of government 
highlights question of determination of what 
he is to watch over, i.e., determination of 
property rights—which the theory obscures 
and thereby functions to reinforce status quo 
set of entitlements (wealth distribution), 
ignoring unequal use of government to 
determine and assign property rights 
f.   Property as part of larger “problem of order” in 
society: ongoing conflict and resolution of 
freedom versus control, continuity versus change, 
hierarchy versus equality 
i.   Positive versus normative theories of 
property: selectively functional in ongoing 
conflicts 
c.    Property rights and the conduct and conclusions of 
economic analysis 
i.    Circularity/tautology re: private property rights and 
optimality (“private property is necessary to yield 
optimal outcomes”):  optimality defined as individual 
adjustment via self-choice (or self-interest pursuit) 
enabled by private property   
ii.   No unique optimal solution: 
a.   Entitlement-specific Pareto-optimal outcomes 
b.   Resource allocation a function of power structure 
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i.    Resource allocation a function of market 
(demand and supply), which is in turn a 
function of power (rights) structure, 
government (re)determination of rights, 
control of government, contest over control 
of government 
iii.   Ineluctable problem of which/whose interests are to 
count:  inevitable distributional, or structural, problem 
a.  If individual preferences are to count, which 
individuals and through what institutional-power 
structure: inevitable problems 
i.  Status quo rights structure or some 
hypothesized one must be used 
iv.   Government and property as interdependent variables 
and as both dependent and independent variables 
v.  Role of selective perception of recognized losses and 
modes of loss, of what is “property” 
F.  Some Principal Points or Conclusions 
1.   Fundamental economic role of government in economic affairs 
a.    Especially regarding legal rights or their equivalent, 
governing whose interests count 
2.    Obfuscation thereof via ideology, yet functional in working 
things out 
3.   Fundamental governmental role even independent of taxing and 
spending: e.g., re relative rights; which dollars of spending do not 
measure 
4.    Laissez faire as government in status quo taken largely for 
granted 
5.   Most economic models abstract from government, thus cannot 
conclusively yield implications re government policy 
a.   Alternatively, models make implicit antecedent assumptions 
as to whose interests count, which govern policy 
implications thereof 
6.   Government as both dependent and independent variable 
7.   Dual nature of rights 
8.   Selective perception of law, government, politics, costs, freedom 
and coercion 
9.    Critical issue tends to be legal change, not intervention into 
situation in which hitherto absent 
a.    General and overriding rule is existence of body of law 
governing all aspects of life 
b.   Conspicuous exception: surrogate parenting Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005 
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i.   Lesson: immediate commencement of development of 
body of law governing legality and relative rights 
10.   Optimality conclusions give selective effect to premises re whose 
interests are to count 
G.  Some Legal-Economic Fundamentals-A Review 
1.   Problem of order 
2.   Dual nature of rights 
3.   Reciprocal character of externalities 
4.   Status quo point: governs realized externality 
a.   Ambiguous and heterogeneous character of status quo 
i.   Selective perception 
ii.   Selective identification of actual or of assumed status 
quo 
b.   Meaning of ‘intervention’ 
c.    ‘Government’ as legal change:  key is control of legal 
change 
d.   Change within status quo:  choice of status quo is choice of 
a particular mode or mechanism of change 
e.   Selectivity re Alpha-Beta rights conflicts and re reciprocal 
externalities in definition of status quo: “what one does in 
assuming a given or hypothetical status quo” 
5. Government 
a.   Fundamental importance of government in status quo and, 
implicitly, in economic models: governs rights and thus 
whose interests count 
b.   Historical elite control and use of government, coupled with 
historical effort to defuse others’ use of government through 
negative attitudes toward government 
c.  Resource allocation as function of market demand and 
supply forces, as function of power structure, as function of 
rights, as function of government, as function of use of 
government 
d.   Economy as object of legal control and law as instrument of 
economic gain-advantage (law as an economic alternative) 
i.    Principle of use of government:  an instrument 
available to whomever can control it 
e.   Government: 
i.   An arena of power and power play 
ii.   Value clarification process 
iii.    Institution of collective action:  mechanism of SWF 
formation and change:  mechanism and process 
iv.  “Collective bargaining state” 
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vi.   A process rather than a completed thing:  something 
`becoming’, rather than `is’ in a final sense 
vii.  Most economic models abstract from government, thus 
cannot conclusively yield implications re government 
policy 
a.    Selective perception of government, law, and 
politics; also of freedom and coercion 
b.   Optimality  conclusions  give selective effect to 
premises re whose interests are to count 
i.   Implication  of  dual nature of rights and 
reciprocal externalities:  inevitable 
noncompensated losses 
viii.  As dependent and independent variable 
ix.   Taxation  and  expenditure as handle by which social 
powers manipulate social structure 
x.    Economic role of government / determination of 
substantive content thereof 
xi.   Diversity of legal roles:  public production, legal rules, 
legal rights, legal change of legal rules and rights 
xii.  Critical issue tends to be legal change, not intervention 
into situation in which government has hitherto been 
absent 
f.    Governance: public, or official government not the only 
institution making decisions having important impacts on 
individuals and their opportunity sets 
i.    Corporations, trade associations, unions, churches, 
international agencies, etc. 
6.   The market: `the market works’ 
a.   Yes 
b.   Within, and giving effect to, power structure 
c.   No unique working out 
d.    Government operates within market `as much as’ market 
operates within law and other institutions 
e.   Normative status of market and of status quo 
i.   Normative-positive treatment 
ii.   Selective perception re:   
a. Market  working 
b.   Change, especially legal change of law 
f.   Joint efficiency- and rights-determination processes: 
Rights structure R1 leads to optimal solution1 
Rights structure R2 leads to optimal solution2 
i.   Making and remaking the status quo 
a.   Critical role of legal change as economic alternative Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005 
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7.   Rationality 
a.   Self-interest / self-choice 
i.   Learning of preferences 
a.    Joint determination of (1) objective function 
(ends) and (2) ends-means relations 
ii.   Assumption of self-interest maximization 
b.    Constrained maximization:  maximizing choice within 
opportunity sets 
c.    Social conditioning and factors governing opportunity set 
formation 
d.  Law makers / law takers 
e.   Uncertainty 
f.   Deliberative versus nondeliberative character of world 
i.   As positive analysis and as conservative principle of 
policy 
ii.   Bounded rationality and radical indeterminacy 
iii.   Unanticipated consequences doctrine 
a.   Problem re methodological individualism 
b.   Aggregation aspect due to interdependence:   
Solo’s composite choice 
g.   Creation versus discovery 
8.   Technical versus subjective solutions: 
a.    Musgrave and Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and 
Practice, l973, p. 5:  “. . . the proper size of the public sector 
is, to a significant degree, a technical rather than an 
ideological issue.” 
Burkhead and Minor, Public Expenditures, pp. 98-9:  “no 
conclusive principle” 
b.   Problem of role of expert in policy making:  problem of 
distinguishing between means and ends when ends are also 
means 
i.   Expertise as road to social power 
a.   Expert-power to define problems and solutions 
c.   Examples: 
i.   Technological versus pecuniary externalities 
ii.   Pareto-relevant and Pareto-irrelevant externalities 
iii.   Posner:  market for rape, babies 
iv.   Fine versus jail:  problem of wealth distribution 
v.   Give rights to transaction-cost minimizing party 
d. Political decision-making: determinants or modes of 
legislative voting: 
i.   Ideology 
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iii.   Party leadership and rules 
iv.   Vote trading 
v.   Within median voter model 
vi.   Situation similar to Adam Smith on formation of moral 
rules: seek approval by others and of oneself:  tail 
chasing 
vii.   Absolutist basis itself reveals rival approaches 
e.   Joint  rights-determination and efficiency-determination 
processes; also re meaning of `public interest’ 
9.   Theories of government as normative attempts to structure, limit, 
open, channel use of government 
a.    Interpret and protect or change status quo rights/power 
structure 
b.   Part of determination of solution to problem of order 
c.   Selective identification of government, freedom, coercion, 
etc. 
i.   Freedom as nonlegal change? 
d.   Presumptive-optimality reasoning bases 
e.   Inevitable normative task 
i.   Latent or explicit? 
f.   Opportunity set approach 
i.   Non-normative 
ii.   Normative premises, qualitative distinctions necessary 
to reach decisions 
g.   Government as instrument available for use 
i.   Arena of power play and largesse 
ii.   Including: which internalities, public goods, grants 
h.   Government as both independent and dependent variable 
i.   Government as important part of opportunity set analysis 
i.   Role of government in opportunity set dynamics 
ii.    Heuristic value of opportunity set-mutual coercion 
analysis re overcoming selective perception of coercion 
and government 
10.   Law-state-government as social control and as power player 
a. Fact  thereof 
b.   Government as power player 
c.   Integrates, channels, controls, promotes, inhibits 
d.   Independent and dependent variable 
e.   Queries: 
i.   By whom, for whom aim, on which/whose terms 
ii.   Whose use of government Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005 
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iii.   When is problem that of controlling state, and when 
that of controlling those who control the state; 
controller of controllers 
a.   Political apparatus as own motivating system 
i.   ‘Independent’ life of politics 
f.   Several important conclusions/hypotheses: 
i.   Government is critical both directly and indirectly to 
economic performance (resource allocation, and 
income and wealth distribution) 
a.    Government releases, marshals, channels, and 
perhaps creates (via facilitating status of mutual 
coercion) of energy 
ii.   Control  of  government to influence economic 
performance is important social process 
iii.   One function of ideology is to legitimize status quo or 
desired power structure; another is to persuade 
believers that economic performance is (or should be) 
independent of government, and thereby protect  
a.   Fostering  belief  in  minimization of government 
while using government, and while perpetuating 
economic structure a function of past government 
action 
iv.  Replete with tautologies and hermeneutic circle 
v.   Statism/antistatism is incomplete, false, misleading 
vi.    Key is control of legal change 
 
5.  RONALD COASE AND RICHARD POSNER: THE COASE 
 THEOREM  AND  WEALTH MAXIMIZATION 
A.   Introduction 
1.   Review of some relevant major themes 
a.   Dual nature of rights 
b.   Reciprocal nature of externalities 
c.   Selective perception, e.g., of rights and of externalities 
i.   Selective perception of realized externalities 
d.   Necessity of normative premises, e.g., re: choosing between 
rights claimants and who can generate impacts 
(externalities) on others:  whose interests are to count 
e.    Different rights structures produce different externalities, 
different price structures, different resource allocations, 
different income distributions 
f.   Intervention as “natural” 
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2.   Some new relevant themes 
a.   Array of externality solutions: 
i.   Education 
ii.   Tax versus subsidy 
iii.   User charges  
iv.   Regulation (standards; prohibition) 
v.   R&D re technology  
vi.   Government production 
vii.   Merger 
viii.  Market for externalities via property rights   
b.   Some general propositions regarding externality generation 
and solutions 
i.   Externalities are inevitable (given reciprocal character) 
and ubiquitous 
ii.   Externalities are reciprocal in character 
iii.    Externalities are a function of scarcity plus 
interdependence 
iv.   Realized externality is function of assignment of rights 
(status quo point) 
v.   Externality solutions are function of power structure 
vi.   Externality-solutions impose externalities of their own, 
including restructuring power, costs and benefits, 
prices, and opportunity sets 
vii.   Fundamental problem of externality policy:  which 
externality, or whose capacity to visit injury on others, 
i.e., distribution of sacrifice 
B.  Coase and the Coase Theorem 
1.    Curious situation:  Coase affirms that institutions matter, because 
of non-zero transaction costs; whereas Stigler adopts zero 
transaction costs to affirm that institutions (initial rights 
assignments) do not matter 
2.   Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” JL&E, October 1960 
a.   “Section II.  The Reciprocal Nature of the Problem:”  “The 
real question that has to be decided is:  should A be allowed 
to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A?” p. 2 
b.   “If factors of production are thought of as rights, it becomes 
easier to understand that the right to do something which 
has a harmful effect . . . is also a factor of production.”  p. 
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c.   “The aim of . . . regulation should not be to eliminate smoke 
pollution but rather to secure the optimum amount of smoke 
pollution, this being the amount which will maximise the 
value of production.” p. 42 Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005 
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3.   Meanings for Stigler: 
a.    (1) Market for externalities:  with fully defined rights, 
permit nonowner to purchase right from owner; optimality 
as Pareto optimality:  exhaustion of gains from trade 
b.    (2) Allocative neutrality:  final resource allocation is 
invariant with initial assignment of rights:  most valued use 
will receive resources, either through owner not selling or 
former nonowner buying 
4.   Assumptions: 
a.   Requires zero transaction costs 
i.   Cooter:  New Palgrave, vol. 1, 469:  “I have argued 
that the forms of market failure are too diverse to be 
subsumed under a reasonably circumspect concept of 
transaction costs, and, consequently, the transaction 
cost interpretation of the Coase Theorem should be 
regarded as false or as a tautology whose truth is 
achieved by inflating the definition of transaction 
costs.” 
b.   Requires other assumptions, elaborated and critiqued 
i.    Indifference to existing distributions of income and 
wealth (taken as given) 
a.   Also, e.g., that an individual’s buying and selling 
prices are the same 
b.   “If assignment of rights is irrelevant, why not give 
me your wallet?” 
ii.    Indifference to the resulting distributions of income 
and wealth, and to resulting price-cost structure 
iii.   Existing system of legal and moral rules, including 
rules governing access to and use of private property, 
taken as given 
iv.   Existing social power structure, e.g., control of 
government 
v.    Existing technology, resources and tastes, as well as 
existing distribution of capacity to derive utility from 
consumption and other economic activity 
vi.   Optimality as meaning individual adjustment through 
trade; only individual preferences to count (problem of 
which individuals) 
vii.  Existence of a market for externalities, or acceptance 
of nonmarket as indicative of no gains from trade 
a.   Equivalent to saying “what is, is and ought to be” 
b.   Problem of larger numbers and organization costs 
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a.   Planetary survival (Greenhouse effect?) 
ix.    Perfect competition, or large number case, or 
indifference to market structure 
x.   Sufficient knowledge (ambiguous in practice:  costly 
acquisition; unequal possession of informatiom) 
xi.   That a local rather than the largest maximum is 
acceptable as the optimum 
5.   Historical significance of Stiglerian “Coase” Theorem 
a.   Counterrevolution against Pigovian welfare economics:  no 
externality problem 
i.    Buchanan and Stubblebine:  Pareto-relevant and 
Pareto-irrelevant externalities 
ii.   Stigler:  no externality problem 
b.    Casuistry issue: finessing contrary conditions through 
adopting qualifying assumptions in order to logically reach 
desired result (as with Say’s Law):  re both market for 
externalities and allocative neutrality 
c.   Central issues: 
i.   Desirability of market solutions  
ii.   Sufficiency of market solutions 
iii.   Legitimization of market per se 
iv.   Allocative neutrality 
a.   A more straightforward, nonideological treatment 
would stipulate and consider that positive and 
unequal transaction costs yield different allocative 
results 
iv.   Casuistry versus study of actual factors at work in the 
economy and which produce the actually realized 
externalities, allocations, and distributions 
a.    “Maximization of value of production” not a 
simple matter 
i.   E.g.,  productivity  etc. a matter of legal 
definition of output 
6.    Coase:  mainstream neoclassical microeconomics fails to give 
effect to transaction costs and thereby fails to indicate how 
institutions determine allocation; allocative solutions are not 
unique 
C.    Posner and the Maximization of Wealth 
1.   Law should/does maximize wealth 
2.   Circularity argument 
3.   Function of courts is determining rights and wealth 
maximization:  “I am not a potted plant.” Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005 
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a.    Recognition, if not affirmation, of inevitable judicial 
activism 
4.    Role of fundamental assumption as to whose interests are to 
count 
 
6.  REGULATION AND DEREGULATION 
A.   Dual nature of rights: dual nature of regulation: control and protect 
1.  regulation is relative, not absolute 
B.   Regulation fundamental, not epiphenomenal 
C.   Regulation both governs and is governed by power 
1.   Functional with regard to whose interests count 
2.    Aspect of contest to control government 
D.   Society as number of regulatory systems 
1.   Law, morality, market, interpersonal interaction 
2.    Society as system(s) of governance:  nominally private, public 
3.   Market as both regulatory system and governed by regulation 
E.   Regulation as functional equivalent of rights in protection of interests 
F.   Regulation as mode of change of rights 
1.   Deregulation and regulatory reform as functional equivalent of 
regulation as source of rights and as change of rights 
a.    Regulation protects Alpha against Beta; deregulation 
protects Beta against Alpha 
2.   Role of selective perception critical 
3.   Selective nature of deregulation and regulation 
4.   Regulation, deregulation, and regulatory reform are functionally 
equivalent re protecting interests 
G.   Rights,  regulation,  deregulation, and regulatory reform all govern 
efficient outcomes 
1.    Efficiency as function of rights, not rights as function of 
efficiency 
2.    Property valuation function of rights function of regulation, 
deregulation 
3.    Value of output maximization function of rights of function 
regulation, deregulation 
H.   Economic theory makes assumptions re rights and interest protection 
which are often juxtaposed to regulation so as to imply propriety of 
deregulation 
1.   Role of implicit normative premises in re whose interests are to 
count 
I.  Regulatory system (administrative regulation, e.g., of public utilities):  
as function of rights per statutes and court decisions, and rights as 
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7. THE  COMPENSATION  PROBLEM 
l.   Paradigm case: airport expansion 
a.   Conflict of what expectations are to be presumed either per se or 
as reasonably held 
2.    Eminent Domain versus Police Power 
a.   Nature of the two principles 
b. Problem not as to process, substance, or valuation in eminent 
domain, but as to applicability of eminent domain principles to 
areas hitherto treated under police power principles 
3.   Conflicting conceptions of rights, including property rights: 
a.  Social theory: rights are socially-legally established protection of 
interests; are subject to revision, destruction; otherwise amounts 
to reification and absolutist legitimation 
b.   Absolute theory: rights are pre-eminent to government and are 
meaningless unless fully protected, which includes full 
compensation for loss or injury 
4.   Principle of selective perception: of injury, of evidence of injury, of 
when injury constitutes legal damage  
a.    Widespread, perhaps inevitable: e.g., injury due to ordinary 
conduct of competition not seen as constituting legal damage, 
whereas other activities are perceived and treated differently; e.g., 
differential abilities of economic actors to introduce changes (e.g., 
technological) which arguably injure others 
b.   In practice, used to generate or sustain arguments for one side or 
another in litigation; also manifests and reinforces particular 
conceptions of economic role of government 
c.   Argument: serious differences between what is typically 
perceived and what is present in reality 
5.   Fifth Amendment Takings Clause 
a.   “. . . not shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.” 
b.   Necessity for principles governing application 
i.    As to scope, e.g., police power actions, entrepreneurial 
actions 
ii.   As to conditions under which it applies or purposes to which 
it is instrumental 
iii.   “Must pay for” implies market as only valuation process:  
seashore property versus porno shops 
c.   These principles are normative in that they represent attempts to 
determine what should govern application of taking clause Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005 
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6.   Representative principles intended to normatively guide the 
administration or application of taking clause 
a.   Frank Michelman, 1967 
i.   Utility: efficiency gains, demoralization costs, and 
settlement costs 
a.   Compensation to be paid whenever settlement costs are 
lower than both demoralization costs and efficiency 
gains 
ii.   Fairness:   
a.   Principles: 
i.    Social arrangements should assure to each 
participant the maximum liberty consistent with 
like liberty on the part of every other participant 
ii.   An arrangement entailing differences in treatment 
is just so long as (a) everyone has a chance to 
attain the positions to which differential 
treatments attach, and (b) the arrangement can 
reasonably be supposed to work out to the 
advantage of every participant, and especially the 
one to whom accrues the least advantageous 
treatment provided for by the arrangement in 
question 
b.   Result: 
i.   Analogous to the equal liberty principle would be 
a rule forbidding all efficiency-motivated social 
undertakings, which have the prima facie effect of 
impairing `liberties’ unequally, unless corrective 
measures are employed to equalize impacts.  The 
second principle, however, would permit a 
departure from this uncompromising rule of full 
compensation if it could be shown that some other 
rule should be expected to work out best for each 
person insofar as his interests are affected by the 
social undertakings giving rise to occasions of 
compensation 
ii.   A decision not to compensate is not unfair so long 
as the disappointed claimant ought to be able to 
appreciate how such decisions might fit into a 
consistent practice 
b.   Joseph Sax, 1971 
i.    No compensation when government action involves 
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ii.    Recognition of public rights on a par with private rights 
(flood control, erosion, economic structure, scenic area, 
historic areas) 
a.   Put competing resource-users in a position of equality 
when each of them seeks to make a use that involves 
some imposition on his neighbors, and those demands 
are in conflict   
b.   The only appropriate question in determining whether 
or not compensation is due is whether an owner is 
being prohibited from making a use of his land that has 
no conflict-creating spillover effects.  If the answer is 
affirmative, compensation is due for the value of land 
for that use. 
c.   With regard to conflicting interests in spillover cases:  
maximize the output of the entire resource base upon 
which competing claims of right are dependent, rather 
than the maintenance of the profitability of individual 
parcels of property 
c. Lawrence Berger, 1974 
i.   Both fairness and efficiency, but fairness is a matter of what 
accords with the community’s sense of fairness and is open 
to widely different interpretations of injustice 
ii.  Efficiency:  minimize sum of (i) nuisance costs (generated 
by harmful externalities), (ii) prevention costs (including 
non-administrative costs and opportunity costs incurred by 
the creator or the victim of a nuisance to reduce the level of 
nuisance costs), and (iii) administrative costs (the public and 
private costs of gathering information, negotiating, writing 
laws, enforcing laws, and arranging for the execution of 
nuisance-control measures 
iii.  First-in-time approach:  if a prior lawful activity is harmed 
by a subsequent lawful activity, both fairness and efficiency 
demand that the costs of eliminating the harm to the earlier 
lawful activity should be borne by the subsequent activity, 
so as to protect every owner in his reasonable expectations 
with regard to those variables under government control that 
affect its value 
d.   Richard Epstein, 1985 
i.    Any removal by government of any right from an 
individual’s bundle of rights is a taking and requires 
compensation, the only exceptions are (supposedly) very 
limited police power ends of prohibiting takings by private Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005 
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parties and the use of force or acts of defamation by private 
parties 
ii.   Yet permits assumptions modifying that rule, e.g., that some 
easement for the benefit of the public at large does exist, 
whether by long-standing custom or by some more overtly 
utilitarian view 
e.   Lawrence Blume and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1987 
i.    Economic argument for compensation is strongest in 
situations in which the risk of loss is large relative to 
individual wealth, or (as a practical alternative) large 
relative to the magnitude of the loss 
f.   Critique: 
i.   Of each principle, foregone here 
ii.   Enormous capacity for selective perception and application 
of each principle and thus enormous differences in 
application of any one principle 
iii.   Enormous differences between principles with regard to 
allocation, distribution, etc. 
iv.    Inescapable property-right determination:  some interests 
affirmed, others denied, as property 
7.   Some general conclusions as to what actually happens or is going on 
in administration of taking clause 
a.   Donald Black, 1987: 
i.    Modern trend toward greater degree of compensatory 
liability of organizations for the misfortunes of individuals 
a.   Strict and absolute standards of liability are more often 
applied to collectivities than to individuals 
ii.    Liability varies directly with social distance, including 
relational, status, and cultural differences 
b.   Samuels and Mercuro, 1979, 1980 
i.   General analysis 
a.   Dual nature of rights: inevitable injury 
b.   Reciprocal character of externalities:  inevitable injury 
c.    Economic significance of rights (e.g., present value 
through capitalization) is dependent on wide variety of 
economic and other conditions - and is not intrinsic to 
the rights themselves 
i.   Legal  determination  that legal significance of 
rights -- that which law protects, is the income 
(and therefore capitalized value) which they 
produce—must assume certain conditions as 
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capitalized value; that is, negates possibility of 
erosion by market forces 
ii.    Ubiquitous compensation problem, because of 
ubiquitous erosions of income and values 
d.   Compensation problem is to determine which interest 
to protect, in each Alpha-Beta conflict, or to which 
potential losses existing values may be exposed 
e.   Inevitability of noncompensated loss:  someone must 
pay 
i.   Selective perception of losses 
ii.    Joint determination of rights and loss-
compensation and loss-noncompensation:  to 
grant or recognize a right is to impose a loss, to 
compensate is to grant or recognize a right and to 
impose a loss on whomever pays for the 
compensation 
a.    Impossibility of Lockean desideratum of 
protecting (property) rights through 
compensation requirement 
b.   Role of compensation in process of 
selectively redetermining rights, rather than 
merely protecting pre-existing rights 
f.   Participation of legal system in social (re)construction 
of economy-society and in confronting radical 
indeterminacy, generating and resolving Alpha-Beta 
conflicts 
i.  Involves exercise of choice within and among 
matrix of legal principles:  inevitable losses due to 
failure to choose a particular principle 
ii.   Involves choice within and among matrix of legal 
rights:  ambiguity of property status quo and of 
future, e.g., including right to introduce 
technological change 
ii.   Roles of the compensation principle: 
a.    Service in the framework of legal policy-making, as 
one in a larger matrix of principles 
b.   Service as a check on arbitrary and tyrannical power—
function of selective perception 
c.   Psychic balm: the very presence of the compensation 
principle serves as psychic balm in face of radical 
determinacy, by obscuring the necessity of choice, by 
affirming the pretense of protected rights, by 
permitting the absorption of the reality of loss through Australasian Journal of Economics Education  Vol. 2. Numbers 1 & 2, 2005 
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reference to high principle, and by soothing the realism 
of instrumentalism and rationality 
d.   Legitimization of decisions which determine rights and 
losses: paradoxically legitimizing all legal change:  by 
compensating in some or many cases, by having the 
principle available, it induces the acceptance of legal 
change without compensation; ostensibly a check on 
legal social control, it is itself a mode of social control; 
it is one means through which the injured are prepared 
to bear losses or educated to be willing to accept them 
iii.   The resolution of the compensation problem 
a.   The determination of inevitable noncompensated losses 
through the joint determination of rights, losses and 
compensation, that is, the determination of 
compensation is part of the determination of rights 
b.    Demand for compensation as species of demand for 
rights 
i.   Pursued through ordinary litigation and lobbying 
c.    Supply side: constrainted maximization decisions by 
legislators and judges, on basis of selectively provided 
information, selectively made normative-subjective 
judgments 
i.   Introduction of a right, that is, of a legal change, is 
a matter of either a rough benefit-cost judgment or 
a rough ideological or moral judgment as to 
propriety or desired-likely instrumental results 
ii.    Economies of scale in influencing legislation 
which favors the relatively wealthy, re access to 
courts and legislature, and re organizational costs 
iii.   Selective perception of reality in general and, in 
particular, of types of externalities, e.g, pecuniary 
versus technological 
iv.   Differential perceptions and treatments of prices 
and taxes as mode of diffusing losses 
v.   Strategic behavior in limiting change, controlling 
agenda of public discussion. 
8.  INEQUALITY AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
1.  Sen Antonio Independent School District et al V. Rodriguez et al, 
411 US. 1 (1873) 
a.  Selective perception of state action in the production and/or 
reproduction of inequality 
b. Unequal  financing of public schools 